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ON WELLINGTONIAN INTERPRETATION: 
A TIMELY REAPPRAISAL 
RUTI TEITEL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Let me begin on a personal note. As for much of my time at New 
York Law School, Harry Wellington has been Dean. I have felt much 
support from Harry in my scholarly development here. Some of that, 
discussed further on in these remarks, relates to our shared interests in 
constitutional jurisprudence. But, more broadly, it has to do with our 
many conversations over the years, about books we've read in com-
mon, about the scholarly enterprise and, more generally, about ideas. 
We have had many wide-ranging conversations, about various scholarly 
contributions to law and politics, and at one point had even formed a 
book club on the topic.1 I have fond memories of these conversations, 
and hope that they will continue, despite Harry's stepping down from 
the deanship. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE STANDARDS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
I now turn to my sense of Harry's influence in the area of constitu-
tional interpretation, Harry's 1973 Yale Law journal article entitled 
Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Ad-
judication. 2 In teaching constitutional law, virtually every year, I launch 
into the problem of constitutional interpretation at the very beginning 
of the course, 3 I have assigned my students parts of Constitutional Double 
Standards. In assigning the article, it has been my sense that it was 
important to address early on the problem of interpretation in the 
broader context of the legitimacy of judicial review. Moreover, it was 
1. Where we read, for instance, JoHN RAWLS, THE LAw OF PEOPLES; WrrH "THE 
IDEA OF Pusuc REAsoN REvisITED" (Hanr. Univ. Press 1999) and RONALD DwoRKIN, 
LIFE'S DOMINION: AN .ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREE-
DOM (Knopf Press 1993). 
2. See Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: 
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L. J. 221 (1973). 
3. This despite that the text I use, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (Geoffrey R Stone et al. 
eds., Little Brown & Co. 3d ed. 2000), discusses issues of interpretation in the second 
semester. 
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also my sense, in the context of reading a variety of scholarly views on 
the interpretation debates, that it was helpful to students to see their 
own Dean offering a way out of the thicket of the interpretation 
debates.4 
With the passage of time, my appreciation for the Constitutional 
Double Standards article has only grnwn. There has been an enduring 
influence of arguments in the Constitutional Double Standards article, 
and an abiding impact of that piece on three debates on interpretation 
in constitutional law, as well as on my own writing in constitutional 
theory. In the remainder of my remarks, I would like to further pursue 
these introductory comments and to discuss the enduring influence of 
Constitutional Double Standards on three debates. First, its influence on 
the debate over constitutional interpretation, in particular, on original-
ism and the role of history; second, on the so-called civic-republican-
ism debate regarding the various conceptions of constitutional 
identity, constitutional self and community in constitutional theory; 
and last, the debate over theories of constitutional change. 
In 1973, Harry published Constitutional Double Standards, where he 
explores what today may well be constitutional dogma in the United 
States Supreme Court's theory of interpretation, the use of "double 
standards" concerning various areas of lawmaking-in particular, eco-
nomic liberties and fundamental rights.5 The first observation about 
Constitutional Double Standards is its date, in constitutional law, the now 
perhaps infamous date of1973, the year Roev. Wadewas decided.6 The 
timing of the article turned out to be auspicious because, even at the 
time, Harry would, as we shall see, anticipate many of the challenges 
that would later appear concerning Roe. Indeed, the article is so pre-
scient, it is almost prophetic. As it engages Roe, it explicates problems 
in Roe's reasoning,7 flaws that would later become the subject of sub-
stantial scholarly discussion.8 
Not only was Constitutional Double Standards ahead of its time, but it 
would later have an enduring impact on a number of subsequent de-
bates about constitutional interpretation. For one, after Roe v. Wade, 
4. See infra pp. 5-8 for the discussion of the originalism debate. 
5. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, at 152, n.4 (1938) Q. 
Stone, dissenting). 
6. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
7. See Wellington, supra note 2. 
8. Compare John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE L.J. 920 (1973), with Phillip B. Heymann & Douglas E. Barzelay, The Forest and the 
Trees: Roe v. Wade and Its Critics, 53 B.U. L. REv. 765 (1973). 
2000-2001] ON WEIJJNGTONIAN INTERPRETATION 227 
the interpretation debates really got going. The opinion spurred sub-
stantial scholarly and other exchange regarding what interpretive prin-
ciples appropriately guide judicial review. There would also be 
subsequent debates about the relation of our constitutional theory and 
constitutional identity on civic-republicanism, which I will discuss fur-
ther on in these remarks. 
The ingenious point in Constitutional Double Standards goes to what 
is commonly thought to be the flaw in Rne.9 the problem of the Court 
somehow arrogating illegitimate power, in engaging in judicial review 
on an issue implying a moral question. The brilliant move in Constitu-
tional Double Standards is that it simply concedes that the issues treated 
in Rne v. Wade raise moral questions. And, rather than fudge the point, 
Harry runs with it. 
Indeed, this concession becomes the basis for the important claim 
the article makes, that it is not in spite of, but because of, the character 
of the abortion issue, that the Court is in a good position to offer reso-
lution. At least, the Court is in a comparatively far better position than 
the other political branches, which necessarily act in a more transient, 
and politically exposed fashion. This is an important argument that 
gives rise to the theory of judicial review proposed in Constitutional 
Double Standards. The article goes on to explicate Harry's understand-
ing of the meaning of "conventional morality,"10 and of precisely why 
the judiciary is in a better position than the legislature to translate 
what constitutes conventional morality. 
The important move made early on in the article is to address 
exactly what sorts of questions are at stake when the Court addresses 
issues of fundamental rights. Moreover, the article explicates just why 
the Court is in a position of peculiar competence to decide these 
questions. 
Let me pursue this point further. Constitutional Double Standards 
illuminates a particular method and role of constitutional adjudica-
tion. Here, Harry's work is extremely important, because it explicitly 
joins issue with the scholarship challenging judicial review in the area 
of morality as lacking in constraints. By contrast, Constitutional Double 
Standards suggests that such review is not an unbounded interpretive 
strategy, but rather a highly constrained exercise. Moreover, the arti-
cle also contends that the proposed interpretive strategy of constitu-
9. See Wellington, supra note 2, at 299. 
10. See id. 
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tional common law is not a matter of sterile logic, but rather one that 
is situated within a particular context and history. The notion he elab-
orates is that the relevant moral principles of what he terms "conven-
tional morality"11 are not ideals in a vacuum, but rather norms that 
emerge in particular societies and at particular times. Through this 
conception, the article anticipates the later critique of the Court's 
power grab, and addresses it through a neat set of arguments about the 
character of judicial competence and judicial process. 12 By addressing 
what the Court must do when it decides questions in the area of sexual-
ity and reproduction, the article clarifies just why the Court is the ap-
propriate decisionmaking body with particular competence in the 
realm of individual rights. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE STANDARDS AND THREE DEBATES 
In the next Part, my remarks explore some of the further ramifica-
tions of this proposed argument. In particular, I will discuss the 
dimensions of the Wellingtonian approach to "conventional morality" 
as situated in time, in a distinct history, and tradition. 13 Constitutional 
Double Standards discusses just how issues involving morality ought not 
be considered apart from society, history and tradition, and that, more-
over, this evolving historical understanding is accessible to the Court 
by virtue of its body of precedent. 
A. On Constitutional Tradition 
While Harry's piece anticipates, but does not directly weigh in on, 
the so-called "originalism" debate, 14 by virtue of his position about the 
role of the Court in the project of translating conventional morality, 
11. See Wellington, supra note 2, at 299 (stating that "[t]he meaning of liberty in 
the Fourteenth Amendment ... depends in the first instances upon its weight in the 
conventional morality"). 
Id. 
12. See id. 
13. 13 Id. at 244. 
Unlike the moral philosopher, the court is required to assert our moral 
point of view. This requirement imposes constraints: Judicial reasoning in 
concrete cases must proceed from society's set of moral principles and ide-
als, in much the same way that the judicial interpretation of documents 
(contracts, statutes, constitutions-especially constitutions) must proceed 
from the document. And that is why we must be concerned with conven-
tional morality, for it is there that society's set of moral principles and ideals 
are located. 
14. See id. 
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within a body of adjudication and a line of precedent, he offers us a 
helpful theory about what the appropriate role of history might be in 
constitutional adjudication.15 Harry writes about the challenge of con-
stituting a historical perspective that is appropriate to constitutional 
adjudication.16 The aim, he argues, is a larger historical view-one 
that is, independent from transient politics. Harry proposes the no-
tion of "constitutional common law." This is an important move that 
would have ongoing influence. Harry's conceptualization contends for 
a distinctive place for evolving history in the adjudicatory process of 
constitutional interpretation. 
In considering the direction of subsequent constitutional theo-
rizing, what becomes eminently clear is that Harry Wellington's Consti-
tutional Double Standards article, written at the beginning of the 
heightened period of debate about the Court's role in interpretation, 
has had an enduring influence. Let me offer an illustration. In the 
area of First Amendment and religious freedom, the Court's approach 
appears impliedly to endorse a form of interpretive method, of evolv-
ing history analogous to "tradition." The notion of traditionalism in 
constitutional jurisprudence is the subject of discussion in a piece I 
wrote early in my career reviewing Leonard Levy's First Amendment and 
Origi,nal Intent.17 In that review article I argue that the Supreme 
Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence fails to adopt an interpretive ap-
Id. 
Id. 
15. See Wellington, supra note 2, at 245. 
A society's moral ideals evolve, but cannot be detached from history and 
tradition. One must ask what those ideals have been to know what they are. 
This is important because a society's moral ideals help us understand how 
its moral principles apply in concrete situation. And that is the role of 
moral ideals that concerns us. 
16. 15 See Wellington, supra note 2, at 248. 
The major difficulty for the official charged with the task of determining 
how the moral principles bear in a particular case is in disengaging himself 
from contemporary prejudices which are easily confused with moral princi-
ples. He must escape the passion of the moment and achieve an appropri-
ately historical perspective. This problem is not entirely solved by the 
institutions we do have, but the common law manages reasonably well. 
Judges do not resort to moral principles in their pristine form as justifica-
tion for common law rules. Rather, those principles are worked through a 
process which has some promise of filtering out the prejudices and passions 
of the moment, some promise of providing the judge with distance and a 
necessary historical perspective. 
17. See Ruti Teitel, Original Intent, History and Levy's Establishment Clause, 15 LAw & 
Soc. INQUIRY 591 (1990). 
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proach deriving from either side of the originalism debate. In the do-
main of religious freedom, the Court's role has not merely been to 
endorse original intent, that is the history associated with the founders, 
but rather to give meaning to some sense of what constituted the long-
standing practices of the American people. And, in this regard, the 
Court has largely eschewed simplistic understandings of "original in-
tent," for a more complicated understanding of history, that appears 
akin to "tradition." The notion of longstanding or evolving history in 
constitutional adjudication is a theme that is resonant in Dean Welling-
ton's work and has been significant in the Court's method of interpre-
tation. Further, the idea of a sharable history that might constitute a 
constitutional community that shares affinities with my own thinking 
on constitutional interpretation. 18 
Still, notwithstanding the above, there is room to critique what I 
have characterized as "traditionalist" approaches to constitutional juris-
prudence. While traditionalist approaches are no doubt more dy-
namic than "originalist" perspectives, traditionalism still retains an 
inherent element of conservatism that does not allow quick change. 
Nevertheless, rather than an entirely static approach, traditionalism al-
lows a gradualism to constitutional change. This notion of gradual 
transformation has certainly emerged in the Court's decisions, particu-
larly in the area of religious tradition. In the religion clause doctrine, 
the Court has extended protection to majoritarian religious practices 
and, in so doing, has defined our national religious heritage. 19 Thus, 
for example, it has supported prayers in the state legislature,20 allowed 
public Christmas displays, 21 and permitted legislation of Sunday and 
other official holidays,22 while denying similar protection for the relig-
ious practices of new minorities.23 This jurisprudence clearly reflects 
that there are affinities between a traditionalist approach and the Wel-
lingtonian understanding of "conventional morality." While we might 
well have serious concerns about the judicial deployment of a "tradi-
tion" test, Wellington's "conventional morality" still plausibly offers an 
underlying historical perspective, that is more dynamic than original-
ism, in constitutional interpretation. 
18. See id. 
19. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
20. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
21. See Lynch, 465 U.S. 668. 
22. See id. 
23. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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B. On Constitutional Identity 
In this Part, I tum to another area where the Wellingtonian inter-
pretative approach to constitutional common law has had enduring 
significance. This is the so-called "civic republicanism" debate con-
cerning the construction of our constitutional identity and its relation 
to constitutional interpretation.24 While Harry Wellington's writing on 
interpretation prefigures the civic-republicanism debate, it is neverthe-
less of relevance to this discussion in constitutional law. This debate 
concerns the ongoing tension between liberalism versus republican-
ism, individualism versus community, self-interest versus civic virtue. 
In this regard, the ideas Harry Wellington wrote about, both in Consti-
tutional Double Standards, as well as in his book, Interpreting the Constitu-
tion, 25 offer a bridging function that can usefully mediate the conflicts 
at the heart of the so-called republicanism debate. Considered within 
the framework of Wellingtonian interpretive theory, this debate to 
some extent, raises an arguably artificial tension. Indeed, the Wel-
lingtonian conception of constitutional adjudication-in particular, 
his notion of "conventional morality''-could usefully operate to medi-
ate the tension at the heart of the civic-republicanism debate. 26 The 
Wellingtonian notion of "common law consensus," of adjudication 
over time, points to a special role for the judiciary in mediating the 
supposed tensions between individual rights and community, judg-
ment and politics. Indeed, the Wellingtonian commitment to process 
links up judgment in the context of particular cases, to the broader 
societal political context, and to the political circumstances of the day. 
Seen from the vantage point of these more contemporary debates, 
the Wellingtonian understanding of judicial process has an added 
profound political dimension, as it offers a basis for constitutional 
identity that is importantly grounded in a distinctive American idea 
regarding the appropriate balance between individual rights, and com-
mitment to family, community and nation. 
24. See generally Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reviva~ 97 YALE L. J. 1539 
(1988). 
25. See HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME 
CoURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (Yale Univ. Press 1990). 
26. See supra n. 11. 
232 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
C. On Constitutional Change 
The third area where Harry Wellington's work in constitutional 
interpretation prefigures an important debate, that anticipates a con-
temporary conversation, concerns the form of constitutional change. 
Indeed, the question Harry poses in his scholarship, of what are the 
appropriate form and processes of constitutional change has been an 
area of important engagement in my own work.27 In recent years, in 
part because of substantial political transition throughout the world, 
we have been experiencing a boom period in constitutionalism, what 
might be regarded as a third wave in new constitution-making, and in 
the establishment of constitutional courts, the biggest since the post 
World War II period.28 Moreover, at the very time of this third wave, 
the United States has been celebrating its constitutional bicentennial 
and two hundred years of constitutional continuity. Given this consti-
tutional legacy, our Constitution has been the subject of study and em-
ulation throughout the world, and our constitutional scholars have 
been simultaneously engaged in advisory processes in the area of con-
stitutional law. And, while all of this has been occurring, the question 
that inevitably arises is just how enduring is our Constitution? Isn't 
there something somewhat strange about the received account of our 
supposed constitutional continuity? Might there not be a counter ac-
count of constitutional evolution? In the last decade of the twentieth 
century, a myriad of questions arise regarding the character of our 
constitutional change, and in particular, concerning the relationship 
between our political and our constitutional regime, the following 
questions have arisen: To what extent is our constitution changing or 
unchanging? What counts as legitimate constitutional change? Does 
our constitutional system contemplate methods of constitutional 
change beyond the amendment process? Some of Harry's colleagues 
at Yale, such as Bruce Ackerman, have explored these questions, and 
have proposed a number of alternative forms and processes of consti-
tutional amendment, but, more generally, contend for a clear distinc-
27. Se!' Ruti Teitel, Transitional jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transjonna-
tion, 106 YALE L. ]. 2009, 2057-58 (1997) (proposing theory of "transitional 
constitutionalism"). 
28. On constitutionalism in the post-war period, see CoNsrITUTIONALISM AND 
RIGHTS: THE INFLl'ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD (Louis Henkin et 
al. eds., 1990). 
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ti.on between constitutional transformation and ordinary processes of 
political change. 29 
My understanding of the idea of "constitutional common law'' it-
self anticipates this more contemporary debate about the character 
and processes of constitutional change. Wellingtonian "constitutional 
common law", I suggest, is not only an idea about constitutional inter-
pretation, but it also implies a normative claim about how American 
constltutlonalism is to develop and grow. Wellingtonian constitutional 
common law offers a conception about the pace, the method and even 
the substance of constitutional change. The idea of an adjudicatlon-
centered, process-centered model of constitutional review informs the 
conception of constitutional change. Indeed, by its very character, 
Wellingtonian interpretive theory contemplates change and is predi-
cated upon a certain form, rhythm and tempo of constitutional 
change. 
The notion of constitutional common law cannot help but imply a 
position on a related issue regarding constltutlonalism, about what is 
the right approach to constitutional transformation. 30 While Bruce 
Ackerman contends prominently for an idealized vision of "constitu-
tional moments" as the appropriate form of constitutional change, the 
Ackermanian view would be hard to reconcile with Harry Wellington's 
vision of constitutional adjudication and his contextual notion of con-
stitutional change.31 While Constitutional Double Standards' certainly 
does not argue for a monist view of democracy, as it surely contem-
plates diverse forms of constitutional review; by way of contrast to the 
more romantic, idealized Ackermanian view of revolutionary constitu-
tional change, on the Wellingtonian account, one can expect constitu-
tional change to occur as an ordinary matter, through regular, 
ongoing processes of adjudication. To whatever degree constitutional 
change is predicated on the Wellingtonian account, it will be slow and 
gradual. This normative conception is-above all-a gradualist theory 
of constitutional change. 
The notion of gradual constitutional change resonates in my own 
work. To some degree, my view of "transitional constltutlonalism"32 
29. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (Harv. Univ. Press 1991); 
see generally Symposium, Moments of Change: Transfonnation in American Constitutionalism, 
108 YALE LJ. 1917 (1999). 
30. See id. 
31. See Wellington, supra note 2. 
32. See Teitel, supra note 27, at 2057-58. 
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shares Harry Wellington's sense of gradual evolving change. That is, 
we share the view that, it is a mistake to overstate the distinction be-
tween constitutional adjudication and politics. Dimensions of Harry 
Wellington's writing resonate here with the account proposed in my 
book, Transitional Justice,33 as well as in my earlier article on transi-
tional constitutionalism.34 
The notion of gradual, evolving constitutional change is helpful 
because it helps to reconcile our experience ·with that of other coun-
tries, allowing more meaningful comparative constitutional jurispru-
dence. Indeed, considered over time, it becomes evident that our 
Constitution has evolved and changed, and not merely in periods of 
explicit constitutional amendment. In Transitional justice, I write about 
American constitutional law from a "transitional" prospective, and of-
fer "transitionality" as a theory and method of constitutional interpre-
tation in constitutional processes. These ideas, while drawn from an 
empirical study of comparative transitional phenomena, have norma-
tive implications. Namely, that we might rather think of constitutional-
ism not as unidirectional, forward-looking and fully prospective, but 
rather to conceive of a constitutionalism of diverse modalities and 
modes of entrenchment. And, applying this idea to our own Constitu-
tion, we see that our own Constitution reflects embedded transforma-
tive constitutional modalities. This idea is elaborated further in my 
book; it shares much with the Wellingtonian approach to constitu-
tional change. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, above I have discussed the enduring influence of 
the Wellingtonian approach to constitutional interpretation, and, in 
particular, how it has affected three debates regarding the relationship 
of constitutionalism and democracy. Dean Wellington's work has had 
an important impact in offering mediating concepts of constitutional 
common law with ramifications for constitutional tradition, constitu-
tional identity, and lastly, for constitutional transformation. Reapprais-
ing Dean Wellington's work, in the light of history, suggests it has had 
a significant and enduring influence. This symposium is truly a fitting 
tribute, as it invites a revisiting of Harry Wellington's earlier work, and 
situates it within the broader constitutional project of the last decades. 
33. See Ruti Teitel, TRANSITIONALjusr1cE (Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
34. See Teitel, supra note 27. 
